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China’s Implementation of the UN Sales 
Convention Through Arbitral Tribunals* 
MARK R. SHULMAN** AND LACHMI SINGH*** 
Because of China’s enormous and fast-growing econ-
omy and its increasing role in shaping global gover-
nance, the evolving rule of law system in the People’s 
Republic poses some of the most critical challenges 
and opportunities for peace and prosperity in our era.  
This article examines a feature of the private law sys-
tem which has developed over the past three decades 
alongside—arguably instead of—a reliable public or-
der for resolution of international commercial dis-
putes.  It does so by focusing on the decisions issued 
by China’s pre-eminent arbitral association—the 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC) in Beijing. This article ex-
amines the role of CIETAC in China’s dispute resolu-
tion system, discussing its practices, its procedures 
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and some of the problems that have arisen in regards 
to settling disputes with foreign parties. In particular, 
it undertakes a close examination of CIETAC deci-
sions interpreting the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods which 
has been in effect in China since January 1, 1988 and 
provides the default scheme that regulates all eligible 
international sales of goods transactions among par-
ties.  A leading authority on law in China has argued 
that CIETAC’s practices need substantial reform if 
they are to adhere to the standards of other interna-
tional arbitral tribunals. Based on the information 
currently available, however, we tentatively conclude 
that concerns such as those about pro-Chinese bias or 
corruption in this system are either not in evidence or 
are being addressed. We believe that the glass is half 
full and generally becoming fuller—at least for the 
peaceful and just resolution of international commer-
cial disputes. 
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It is better to die of starvation than to become a thief; it is  
better to be vexed to death than to bring a lawsuit.1 
 
In death avoid hell; in life avoid the law courts.2 
 
Chinese Proverbs 
I. CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS 
A. Introduction 
Over the past thirty years, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)—with its enormous population,3 rapidly developing economy 
and astounding industrial capacity—has transformed the world’s 
economy while simultaneously developing and reforming its own in-
stitutions.  Even more noticeably since its accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001,4 China’s influ-
ence on the global system of trade has been immense.  In 2008, Chi-
na ranked third among the world’s nations for the claimed value of 
merchandise imported and second for the value of merchandise ex-
ported.5  In terms of merchandise trade—consisting of agricultural 
products, fuels and mining products and manufactured products—
 
 1. Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. 
REV. 1201, 1201 (1966). 
 2. ALASDAIR CLAYRE, 1 THE HEART OF THE DRAGON 184 (1985). 
 3. See China Population Development and Research Center, http://www.cpirc.org.cn/ 
en/eindex.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (providing information on the growing population 
of China). 
 4. World Trade Organization, Statistics Database, Trade Profile:  China, http:// 
stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CN (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 5. Id. 
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China commands over an eight-percent share of the world’s total ex-
ports and over a six-percent share of the world’s total imports.6  And 
with long-standing growth rates reported to be near ten percent,7  the 
Chinese economy is a key driver for development around the world. 
Such fast growth and high levels of trade have had significant 
implications for the development of sales law and of a true rule of 
law system in China.  It is evident to any lawyer that with such an 
enormous number of transactions, myriad disputes are certain to fol-
low.  In fact, numerous high-profile suits have come to light—most 
notably when non-conforming goods pose consumer safety concerns. 
Indeed, during 2007 and 2008 when we started the research for this 
article, one could hardly turn on the television news or open the 
newspaper without finding yet another case arising from unsafe 
products manufactured in China.  A range of products including me-
lamine, heparin, pet food, tires, toothpaste and toys have all been re-
called because dangers to consumers have been discovered.8   In 
2007, the European Union reported some 440 different products from 
China to be unsafe for consumer use.9  In 2009, tests carried out by 
the Bureau of Industry and Commerce in Guangdong province on 
over 200 products (including beverages, children’s clothing and sani-
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Xu Dashan, China’s Economy to Grow 8% Annually from 2006 to 2010, CHINA 
DAILY, Mar. 21, 2005, http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/21/content_ 
426718.htm.  For more recent data, see CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (C.I.A.), THE 
WORLD FACTBOOK:  CHINA (2009), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html. 
 8. The news about tainted products from China has become so frequent and important 
that the New York Times website includes a special page dedicated to  surveying it.  New 
York Times, Times Topics, Consumer Safety and China, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
reference/timestopics/subjects/c/consumer_product_safety/china/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2010).  See also David Barboza, China Orders New Oversight  of Heparin, With 
Tainted Batches Tied to U.S. Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2008, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/03/22/world/asia/22heparin.html; David Barboza, China Begins 
Inspections of Ingredient Tied to Tainted Pet Food, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2007, http:// 
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0CEFD8113EF936A35756C0A9619C8B63; 
David Barboza, China to Revise Rules on Food and Drug Safety, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/07/business/worldbusiness/07safety.html; Andrew Martin, 
Chinese Tires Are Ordered Recalled, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/business/worldbusiness/26tire.html; Louise Story & David 
Barboza, Mattel Recalls 19 Million Toys Sent From  China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/15/business/worldbusiness/15imports.html. 
 9. Press Release, European Commission, Consumer Affairs, China and Product 
Safety:  Frequently Asked Questions (Jul. 19, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid 
/pressReleases Action.do?reference=MEMO/07/299. 
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tary products) revealed that only forty-nine percent of these complied 
with quality standards.10 
The Chinese government has responded to the resulting back-
lash from foreign importers by declaring a “special battle” against 
poor product quality.11  Vice-Premier Wu Yi, head of a Cabinet-level 
panel on food safety and quality, stated, “This is a special battle to 
protect the safety and interests of the general public, as well as a war 
to safeguard the made-in-China label . . . .”12  The Chinese govern-
ment has taken a strong stand when it comes to punishing those re-
sponsible for producing tainted or unsafe products.  In a recent case 
involving milk powder that was contaminated with melamine, pu-
nishment handed down to the executives of the company responsible 
ranged from two years to life in prison.13  The two persons directly 
linked to the contamination were executed for their role in the deaths 
of six children.14  While Chinese authorities scramble to implement 
new safety and product standard regulations, there are still outstand-
ing issues arising from the sale and consumption of tainted goods; 
some of these are currently pending in courts and arbitral tribunals 
across China. 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG or the Convention) has been in effect in 
China since January 1, 1988, and provides the default scheme that 
regulates all eligible international sales of goods transactions between 
parties within Contracting Member States.15  The Convention’s signi-
 
 10. Qiu Quanlin, ‘Unsafe’ Products Still on Shelves in Guangdong, CHINA DAILY, June 
30, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-06/30/content_8336609.htm. 
 11. China Declares War on Unsafe Products, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 24, 2007, 
http://www.mywire.com/a/EnvironmentNewsService/China-Declares-War-Unsafe- 
Products/4448439/.  As part of the effort to clamp down on corruption, a  Beijing court 
imposed the death penalty on Zheng Xiaoyu, the former head of the State Food and Drug 
Administration.  He was executed on July 10, 2007.  Joseph Kahn, China Executes Former 
Drug Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/business/ 
worldbusiness/11execute-web.html. 
 12. China Declares War on Unsafe Products, supra note 11. 
 13. Sharon LaFraniere, 2 Executed in China for Selling Tainted Milk, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/world/asia/25china.html. 
 14. Id. 
 15. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 
11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1984), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].   See also 
Pace  Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG Database, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2010)  (providing a continually growing 
electronic database of court judgments and arbitral awards interpreting the CISG).  Like the 
U.S., the PRC has made an Article 95 declaration and is therefore not bound by Article 
1(1)(b) of the Convention.  See Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, 
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ficance can hardly be overstated given that China’s largest trading 
partners are the United States, the European Union, and the Republic 
of Korea, each of which is a Contracting State under the CISG.16 
While much of the scholarly literature on the CISG has fo-
cused on the decision-making of national courts,17 relatively little has 
been written on the decisions of arbitral panels.  This article ex-
amines the latter—in particular, decisions of the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).18  Many 
contracting parties prefer arbitration over other methods of dispute 
resolution because it is relatively speedy and cost-efficient while 
yielding decisions that are binding and enforceable in domestic 
courts, pursuant to the terms of the 1958 Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Con-
vention).19  These purported advantages of arbitration over litigation 
in the courts appear to be particularly desirable in China where do-
mestic courts have long been considered susceptible to the vicissi-
tudes of corruption and political influence. 
CIETAC is one of the largest and most important arbitration 
institutions in China.  While it is often difficult to obtain reliable in-
sights into decision-making in China and particularly from alternative 
dispute mechanisms, we were fortunate to have access to translations 
 
CISG Database, CISG:  Participating Countries – China  (PRC), http://www.cisg.law.pace. 
edu/ cisg/countries/cntries-China.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 16. All E.U. members are state parties to the CISG with the notable exceptions of the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Portugal.  See Pace Law School  Institute of International 
Commercial Law, CISG Database, CISG:  Table of Contracting States, http://www.cisg.law. 
pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 17. See UNCITRAL DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED  NATIONS  CONVENTION ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (2008), available at http://www.uncitral.org/ 
pdf/English /clout/08-51939_Ebook.pdf.  See also Pace Law School Institute of International 
Commercial Law, CISG Database, UNCITRAL Digest Cases Plus Added Cases, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest-cases-toc.html (last visited  Feb.  2, 2010) 
(providing electronic access to all information in the 2008 UNCITRAL Digest, as well as 
“[l]inked citations to more recent cases and other cases that cite or interpret each Article of 
the CISG,” section outlines and footnote web links to cited cases). 
 18. See generally CIETAC, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission, Introduction, http://cn.cietac.org/english/introduction/intro_1.htm (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2010). 
 19. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].   The New 
York Convention had been acceded to by 143 countries as of  November 25, 2008.   The 
Convention came into force for China as of April 22, 1987. UNCITRAL, Status:  1958 – 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www. 
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.htmlb (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2010). 
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of reasoned opinions issued as a result of over 300 arbitrated disputes 
involving the application of the CISG in China.  Albert H. Kritzer20 
and his colleagues at the Pace University School of Law’s Institute of 
International Commercial Law collected these decisions directly 
from CIETAC and had them meticulously translated before posting 
them on the Institute’s website.21  As of June 2009, of the 345 re-
ported Chinese cases applying the CISG, 290 of these were CIETAC 
awards.22  For purposes of this article, we postulate that these deci-
sions are indicative of the state of the rule of law in China. 
This article examines the role of CIETAC in China’s dispute 
resolution system, discussing its practices, its procedures and some of 
the problems that have arisen in regards to settling disputes with for-
eign parties.  This article first addresses criticisms of CIETAC and 
also tackles questions about Chinese arbitration on the whole.  The 
second section examines decisions reached in the cases dealing with 
defective and unsafe products and discusses how they might impact 
decisions in disputes currently pending before the tribunal.  It con-
cludes with a more wide-ranging discussion of the broader implica-
tions of our findings for the development of the rule of law in China. 
Compared to conditions thirty years ago when Deng Xiaoping 
launched the program to “establish a socialist legal system with Chi-
nese characteristics,”23 we conclude that the glass is half full and 
generally becoming more full—at least for the peaceful and just reso-
lution of international commercial disputes.  Moreover, we believe 
 
 20. Albert H. Kritzer is Executive Secretary of the Institute of International 
Commercial Law, Pace University School of Law and Co-editor of the CISGW3 Electronic 
Library on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
and International Contract Law. 
 21. See Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG Database, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).  For a recent description of these 
cases and this database, see Albert H. Kritzer, Application and Interpretation of the CISG in 
the P.R. of China—Progress in the Rule of Law in China, Presentation at the 2007 
International Seminar on the Application and Interpretation of the CISG in Member States 
with Emphasis on Litigation and Arbitration in the P.R. of China (Oct. 13–14, 2007), in 
40UCC L.J. 261 (2007).  Kritzer has also conducted a statistical analysis of the first 290 
reported cases.  See infra text accompanying notes 232 to 233. 
 22. These statistics were an indication of cases accessible and translated on the Pace 
University School of Law CISG database.  See Pace Law School Institute of International 
Commercial Law, CISG Database, Country Case Schedule:  China, http://www.cisg. 
law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#china (last visited June 10, 2009).  See also Fan Yang, 
CISG in China and Beyond, 40 UCC L.J. 373 (2008). 
 23. Jerome Alan Cohen, China’s Legal Reform at the Crossroads, 169 FAR E. ECON. 
REV. 23, 24 (2006). 
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that the development of reliable and increasingly fair commercial ar-
bitration is likely to have beneficial effects throughout China. 
B. Legal System in China 
We begin our examination of the procedures and practices of 
China’s arbitral system with a brief look at the political, legal and 
economic context in which it developed.  Since the end of the Revo-
lution in 1949, China’s legal landscape has been dominated by the 
political branches and the interests they represent.  For several dec-
ades, no real effort was made to distinguish politics from law, with 
the former consistently dictating the substance, process and applica-
tion of the latter.  Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, however, 
the PRC has undergone dramatic transformations, including the es-
tablishment of a less political and more institutionalized and codified 
system of law.24  While this change has been meaningful, the will of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC or the Party) still continues to 
pervade China’s legal apparatus, both officially and unofficially. 
The legal system in China now operates on a five-tiered go-
vernmental structure with central, provincial, municipal, county and 
village levels.  Each of the tiers operates at its respective level exer-
cising political, legislative, administrative and judicial functions 
complete with its own institutions.25  Likewise, the Party has 
branches in all levels of state affairs.  At the apex, the Supreme 
People’s Court is responsible to the National Party Congress and its 
Standing Committee.  The budgets of each of the local People’s 
courts are subject to the approval of their respective local govern-
ments, and this opens the possibility that these judicial bodies could 
be subject to interference from the government.26  In addition, the 
vice-presidents of the Supreme People’s Court and other top level 
members and judges are usually appointed by the National Party 
 
 24. Human rights lawyer Sharon Hom notes that “[t]here has been significant progress 
toward rebuilding the legal system in China since the early 1980s,  including impressive 
legislative activity, training of legal personnel (lawyers, judges, law professors) and 
development of legal and administrative institutions and processes [but there remain] 
difficult challenges in light of persistent structural and systemic problems including:  
endemic corruption and influence of guanxi (relationships), levels of legal competency, the 
role of the CPC and the lack of an independent judiciary and bar.”  Sharon K. Hom, 
Foreword:  Circling Towards Law, 2 CHINA RTS. F., Feb.–Apr. 2007, at 19, 19, available at 
http://www.hrichina. org/public/PDFs/CRF.2.2007/CRF-2007-2_Circling.pdf. 
 25. KUI HUA WANG, CHINESE COMMERCIAL LAW 13–14 (2000). 
 26. Id. at 26. 
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Congress, making the lines of judicial impartiality difficult to distin-
guish.27 
Article 126 of the Constitution of the PRC states that “[t]he 
people’s courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial 
power independently and are not subject to interference by adminis-
trative organs, public organizations or individuals.”28  However, in 
practice this is not always the case.29  Many have criticized the gov-
ernment for its continuing failure to provide for a more thorough se-
paration of political and judicial functions, a shortcoming that seems 
inevitably to lead to the subjugation of the resolution of individual 
disputes to political pressure.30  Typically such interference involves 
members of the judiciary and the government working together to 
protect their individual or institutional interests.31 
More recently, China’s leaders have gone further and prom-
ulgated the “Three Supremes”—a hierarchy of interests that judges 
should account for in their decision-making.32  The Communist Party 
of China is the first “Supreme.”  Next come the people.  The Consti-
tution and the law constitute the third “Supreme.”  In addition to (but 
not unrelated to) the indeterminate impact of this directive, some un-
known number of “sensitive” cases are decided by the “adjudication 
 
 27. Id. at 27–29. 
 28. XIAN FA art. 126 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
 29. See Hom, supra note 24, at 19.  Professor John Head of the University of Kansas 
School of Law also offers an enlightening discussion of the meaning of the rule of law in 
China, starting with the provocative question:  “should the nearly absolute authority of the 
CPC over China’s system of law and governance, coupled with the absence of a genuinely 
representative legislature reflecting direct influence by society at large, lead us to conclude 
that China is not in fact a ‘rule of law country’ as its Constitution proclaims?”  JOHN W. 
HEAD, CHINA’S LEGAL SOUL:  THE MODERN CHINESE LEGAL IDENTITY IN HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT 127 (2009).  He concludes that a “‘thin’ rule of law . . . does exist in today’s 
China, although only barely.”  Id. at 148. 
 30. See KUI HUA WANG, supra note 25, at 16. 
 31. Id. at 27–28. 
 32. In December 2007, President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao announced the 
Three Supremes.  The new Supreme Court President Wang  Shengjun has subsequently 
promulgated them.  See Jerome Cohen, Body Blowfor the Judiciary, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, Oct. 18, 2008, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/17565/body_blow_for_the_ 
judiciary.html (describing the high-level support for the “Three Supremes” and explaining 
how they represent a step backwards in the development of China’s rule of law system).  On 
the other hand, one of the authors (Shulman) recently met with a variety of lawyers and law 
professors in Beijing and Shanghai and came away with the impression that many people 
view the Three Supremes as something of a bad joke, an obstacle in the inexorable 
development of respect for the law. 
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committees” of courts—panels which may not even have heard the 
cases.33 
In the face of this kind of direction from the leadership, the 
professionalization of the judiciary—increasing its capacity, integrity 
and political independence—is proceeding unevenly.  Chapter III of 
the Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the PRC sets out the eligi-
bility criteria for judicial personnel of the People’s courts.34  Specifi-
cally, Article 34 states, 
[c]itizens who have the right to vote and to stand for 
election and have reached the age of 23 are eligible to 
be elected presidents of people’s courts or appointed 
vice-presidents of people’s courts, chief judges or as-
sociate chief judges of  divisions, judges or assistant 
judges; but persons who have ever been deprived of 
political rights are excluded.35 
 
This article was amended in 1983 to add a requirement for of-
fice that “[j]udicial personnel of people’s courts must have an ade-
quate knowledge of the law.”36  Prior to this reform in the 1980s, le-
gal knowledge was not considered a priority, let alone a requirement, 
for eligibility to serve as a member of the judiciary.  Instead, the em-
phasis had been placed on the political qualifications of candidates, 
including such factors as service in the People’s Liberation Army.37  
As recently as twenty years ago, a mere ten percent of judges had en-
joyed higher education in the law.38  More recent statistics offer signs 
that the situation is improving, but of the approximately 200,000 
 
 33. This phenomenon is widely known in China, as attested to by many lawyers 
interviewed during the course of Shulman’s December 2009 visit. 
 34. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo fayuan zuzhifa [Organic Law of the People’s 
Courts] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1979, effective 
Jan. 1, 1980) (amended Sept. 2, 1983), arts. 34–41, translated in China Internet Information 
Center, http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207253.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) 
(P.R.C.) (“The authorized government portal site to China, www.china.org.cn is published 
under the auspices of the [PRC’s] State  Council Information Office and the China 
International Publishing Group in Beijing.”  China Internet Information Center, About Us, 
http://www. china.org.cn/e-logo/about.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).). 
 35. Id. art. 34. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Hairong Zhou, The Re-establishment of the Chinese Legal System:  Achievements 
and Disappointments, 10 CIV. JUST. Q. 44, 54 (1991). 
 38. Id. 
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judges currently serving in the PRC only half have earned a universi-
ty degree of any kind.39 
The government has recognized that the lack of formal judi-
cial training has had a harmful impact on the nation’s international 
business dealings.40  It has been argued that without a proper legal 
education, well-intentioned judges often struggle to cope with deci-
sions involving complex legal issues such as intellectual property 
rights.41  To address these problems, starting in 2002 new judicial 
candidates have been required to pass the State Judicial Exam (SJE) 
which tests their knowledge of legal theory, economic law and public 
and private international law.  When the SJE was first issued, only 
seven percent of the 360,000 people who took part passed.42 
As a result of growing recognition of the depressive economic 
impact of this situation, the PRC is implementing new initiatives, in-
cluding one that offers judges the chance to complete an LL.M. at 
City University in Hong Kong.  This program offers a significant im-
provement to the judges’ international law expertise.43  In addition to 
these initiatives to provide legal training for judges by institutions 
and collaborations outside of the PRC, domestic mechanisms have 
also been instituted.  These include two training institutes for judges, 
the National Judges College and the Spare-time University.44  Both 
of these institutions are run and financed by the Supreme People’s 
Court.45  There are also various Chinese universities and training cen-
ters which provide on-the-job training to those already employed in 
the judiciary.46 
 
 39. Benjamin L. Liebman, China's Courts:  Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA  Q. 620, 
625–26 (2007). 
 40. Liying Zhang, Hong Kong Launches Masters Program for Mainland Judges, ALB 
NEWS, Jan. 23, 2009, http://asia.legalbusinessonline.com/news/breaking-news/32198/ 
details.aspx. 
 41. Jianqiang Nie, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China:  
Institutional Challenges 9, Seminar Presentation at the University of Melbourne Law School 
(Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.ipria.org/events/seminar/Enforcement%20of%20IP%20in 
%20China.ppt. 
 42. VINCENT CHENG YANG, JUDICIAL AND LEGAL TRAINING IN CHINA:  CURRENT 
STATUS OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TOPICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (2002), available 
at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/Beijing_August_2002.pdf. 
 43. See Liying Zhang, supra note 40. 
 44. YANG, supra note 42, at 8–9. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 5.  See also Chinese Judges Observe American Law in Action,  COLUM. L. 
SCH.  MAG., Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/magazine/153242/ 
chinese-judges-observe-american-law-in-action. 
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The demand for greater levels of expertise certainly exists.  In 
joining the WTO, China has had to reform many of its own laws to 
conform to WTO standards, and this has meant that the judges have 
also had to enhance their levels of expertise to cope with the ever-
increasing caseloads.  Therefore, when comparing the position of the 
judiciary today with that of a few years ago, we can see that mea-
ningful steps are being taken to improve the quality of training for 
judges.47  The results of these various initiatives will require time to 
take effect, particularly in light of the large number of judges to be 
trained and the costs involved. 
In addition to the problems associated with the competency of 
the judiciary, careful observers have also noted that many of the legal 
proceedings that take place in the courts frequently lack some meas-
ure of transparency.  Courts sometimes refuse even to disclose what 
rules they are applying.48  And with this opacity and the pervasive-
ness of the Communist Party, politics—and all too often the material 
interests of influential people—frequently prevail over an  impartial 
application of the law. 
As Alice Tay and Conita Leung explain, Chinese “[l]aws and 
regulations have to be understood in this wider context of a society in 
which the formal legal position is only one consideration and still of-
ten not the most important.”49  The difference between the Western 
formalistic approach to the rule of law and the Chinese approach is 
further illustrated in the ways that contracts are perceived.  For ex-
ample, a Chinese negotiator may see a contract not as a legally bind-
ing document with predictable legal consequences, but as an expres-
sion of one’s willingness to cooperate and to enter into a friendly re-
relationship.50  This perception contrasts starkly to the standard 
Western view, in which the wording of the contract controls interpre-
 
 47. See, for example, the program offered by Columbia Law School as part of the 
LL.M. at the City University of Hong Kong.  Columbia Law School, Chinese  Judges to 
Study American Legal System at Columbia Law School (June 5, 2009), 
http://www.law.columbia. edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2009/june2009/ChineseJudges. 
 48. David Livdahl, International Arbitration in PRC, 13 NIHON  KOKUSAI  KEIZAIHO 
NENPO [Y.B. OF INT’L ECON. L.] 103, 105 (2004). 
 49. Alice Tay & Conita Leung, Introduction:  The Relation Between Culture, 
Commerce and Ethics, in GREATER  CHINA:  LAW, SOCIETY, AND TRADE 1, 7 (Alice Tay & 
Conita Leung eds., 2005). 
 50. See KUI  HUA WANG, supra note 25, at 37.  See also Patricia Pattison & Daniel 
Herron, The Mountains Are High and the Emperor Is Far Away:  Sanctity of Contract in 
China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 460 (2003) (“From the Chinese perspective, the ‘final’ contract 
signifies that a relationship exists and terms negotiations may now continue.  The ‘final’ 
contract signals the beginning for real contract negotiations.”). 
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tation and both parties are generally obliged by the terms, as far as is 
practicable (i.e. pacta sunt servanda).51 
Chinese businesspeople tend to shy away from detailed claus-
es within the contract, especially when this would weaken their posi-
tion.52  Instead the negotiation process is given greater influence.  It 
has been argued that, as a result of this climate, negotiating parties 
should keep detailed notes of all negotiations, however informal the 
exchange.53  Furthermore, subsequent amendments to the contract 
and cancellations of the contract after granting final approval are not 
unheard-of in Chinese business practice.54  Westerners are advised 
not to try to resort to making claims based on the breach of specific 
contractual terms, as this is seen as a breakdown in relations between 
the parties.55  This difference in attitude can be summed up in the 
Chinese proverb:  “It is better to keep a friend than to win a victo-
ry.”56  Notwithstanding this difference of approach to the deal, the 
Chinese still manage to conduct enormous volumes of international 
business. 
Foreign parties often struggle with the dual burden of not only 
being unfamiliar with the substance of Chinese law but also not 
knowing where to find it.  This is most evident in the law governing 
contracts.  In addition to the much-lauded Contract Law,57 which 
came into force in 1999, there are other “hidden” sources of law go-
verning contracts in the PRC that may not be easily discernable to fo-
reigners.58  Although contractual issues constitute a relatively small 
part of the Civil Code, they bear significant influence on how courts 
go about interpreting contracts.59  Grace Li argues that these provi-
sions are general in nature and can often be confusing as to their ac-
 
 51. See E. Allan Farnsworth, An International Restatement: The UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (noting that the 
UNIDROIT Principles provide that if “performance becomes more onerous for one of the 
parties, that party is nevertheless bound to perform its obligations.”); E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 37–40 (3d ed. 1999). 
 52. KEVIN BUCKNALL, CHINESE BUSINESS ETIQUETTE AND CULTURE 115 (2002). 
 53. Id. at 115–16. 
 54. Id. at 117. 
 55. Id. at 118. 
 56. Robert F. Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 62 WASH. L. REV. 383, 384 (1987). 
 57. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetongfa [Contract Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (P.R.C.). 
 58. Grace Li, The PRC Contract Law and Its Unique Notion of Subrogation, 4 J. INT’L 
COM. L. & TECH. 12, 14, 16 (2009), http://www.jiclt.com/index.php/jiclt/article/view/67/66. 
 59. Id. at 14. 
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tual meaning, as they rarely serve to define parties’ responsibilities in 
cases of breach.60 
The role of precedent in contract law offers another example 
of a “hidden” source of law.  Precedent does not play a significant 
role in the PRC, in great part because most decisions are not re-
ported.61  Because the Ministry of Propaganda’s consent is required 
before a court can release the text of a decision, the few decisions 
that are made public are released in order to satisfy a political rather 
than a legal agenda.62 
Lastly, foreigners must contend with a multitude of regula-
tions and ordinances handed down by the various levels of adminis-
trative bodies.63  Depending on where the case is heard, these laws 
could affect the outcome of a contractual dispute.  In order to deter-
mine the proper outcome, a court would need to examine the relevant 
ordinances at all levels of government.64  Foreigners may find it ex-
ceedingly difficult to access this information, as it is often published 
only in Chinese.65 
Even this brief examination of the challenges imposed by 
China’s court system demonstrates why foreign investors are often 
reluctant to enter into Chinese legal proceedings in which they may 
encounter unfair practices, opaque procedures and unfamiliar rules. 
Thus, traders frequently turn to alternative dispute resolution, incor-
porating arbitration clauses into their sales contracts.  Chinese com-
panies themselves often prefer such alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to resolve their legal issues, as they too appear to mi-
strust the traditional court system.66 
While the PRC may not adhere closely to the Western con-
ceptions of the rule of law, China’s government has made progress 
 
 60. Id. (citing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo minfa tongze [General Principles of the 
Civil Law] (adopted by the Nat'l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 
113, LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (P.R.C.) (“If  both parties breach the 
contract, each party shall bear its respective civil liability.”)). 
 61. Id.; see also J. H. Matheson, Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China, 15 
MINN. J. INT'L L. 329, 376–77 (2006). 
 62. Li, supra note 58, at 15. 
 63. Id. at 16. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Peter Murray, China, An Emerging Maritime Jurisdiction:  Recent Trends 
Pointing to a New Regime, at 3 (2006), available at http://esvc000873.wic005u.server- 
web.com/docs/Murray_paper.pdf (noting that the total number of arbitrations filed in China 
in 2005 was 48,339). 
6.  Shulman-CISG in China (48.242) - 4.7.10 4/7/2010  10:53 PM 
256 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [48:242 
towards developing a rule of law over the past thirty years.67  By tak-
ing into account the utter lack of independent legal institutions in the 
PRC prior to Deng’s reforms, we can start to appreciate the advances 
made in developing its legal institutions and rules in a relatively short 
amount of time.68  At the same time, the PRC has created a parallel 
system that facilitates trade by enabling traders to resolve commer-
cial disputes through arbitration with relative efficiency, reliability 
and fairness. 
C. Arbitration in China 
As noted above, foreign investors generally choose arbitration 
as the means of resolving disputes in their course of dealings.69  And 
while Chinese law is mostly amenable to arbitration because the PRC 
is a party to the New York Convention, it mandates the use of Chi-
nese arbitration associations or panels for enforcement.70  There are 
180 arbitral bodies in the PRC, several of which have a significant 
caseload of foreign-party disputes.  CIETAC is the oldest and largest 
such body.  CIETAC was established in 1956 as the China Council 
for the Promotion of International Trade.71  It assumed its current 
name in 1988.72  In 2000, it also adopted the additional name of the 
Arbitration Court of the China Chamber of International Com-
merce.73  CIETAC’s head office is located in Beijing, and it has es-
tablished sub-commissions in Shanghai, in Shenzhen and most re-
cently in Tianjin.74  The Central Government oversees CIETAC and 
appoints its Secretary-General.  In 2007, CIETAC dealt with 1,118 
arbitration cases, making it one of the busiest arbitration bodies in the 
 
 67. HEAD, supra note 29, at 147. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Yang, supra note 22, at 377 (discussing the definition of “foreign” in the 
context of “foreign-related contracts”).  Professor Yang concludes that “[t]he fact that the 
current 1999 PRC Contract Law itself does not contain special provisions governing 
international sales contracts reinforces the importance of the CISG as the most influential 
source of law on international contracts in China.”  Id. at 384. 
 70. See New York Convention, supra note 19, art. 2(3). 
 71. CIETAC, Introduction, supra note 18. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Dong Wu, CIETAC’s Practice on the CISG, NORDIC J. OF COM. L., Issue 2005 
No. 2, at 3, http://www.njcl.utu.fi/2_2005/article2.pdf; CIETAC Tianjin International 
Economic and Financial Arbitration Center, Introduction,  http://www.cietac-tj.org/English/ 
Aboutus/Aboutus.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
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world.75  Of these cases, some 429 (thirty-eight percent) included at 
least one foreign party.76 
CIETAC promotes the use of its arbitral services by claiming 
that its practices closely adhere to that of non-Chinese international 
arbitration tribunals.  Its services are presented as independent and 
impartial and as offering a fee structure that is significantly lower 
than that of other major institutions.77  Some commentators dispute 
these claims.  Jerome Cohen, a leading authority on law in China, ar-
gues that CIETAC’s practices need substantial reform if they are to 
adhere to the standards of other international arbitral tribunals.78  Co-
hen served as an arbitrator in a case involving an alleged breach of a 
contract to build a power plant.  In describing his experiences he said, 
“I saw some of the most blatant contract violations I’d ever seen, but 
it was like the [other arbitrators] had been watching a different 
case.”79  We have identified and will proceed to examine the follow-
ing criticisms and areas for potential reforms: 
–the respect for validity of arbitration clauses; 
–the effective and efficient enforcement of CIETAC 
Arbitration awards; 
–CIETAC’s practice of mandating use of its own per-
sonnel as arbitrators, which does not allow for fair 
proceedings; 
–decision-making and record-keeping, which need to 
be more transparent in order to ensure the integrity of 
the process; and that 
–CIETAC administrative fees, which are actually 
higher than that of comparable institutions. 
Each of these concerns is substantiated and important.  However, our 
analysis of the published arbitral decisions and the secondary litera-
ture suggests that they are neither as pervasive nor as damning as 
they might appear at first glance and in most cases steps are being 
taken towards improving the existing regime. 
 
 75. Li Zhang, The Enforcement of CIETAC Arbitration Awards, HONG  KONG LAW., 
Feb. 2002, available at http://www.hk-lawyer.com/InnerPages_features/0/804/2002/2. 
 76. Ashby Jones & Andrew Batson, Concerns About China Arbitration Rise, WALL ST. 
J., May 9, 2008, at B1 (indicating that CIETAC received 684 cases in 2002, 709 cases in 
2003, 850 cases in 2004, 979 cases in 2005, 981 cases in 2006 and 1,118 cases in 2007). 
 77. CIETAC, Introduction, supra note 18. 
 78. Jerome Cohen, Time to Fix China’s Arbitration, 168 FAR E. ECON. REV.  31, 32 
(Jan. 2005); see also Michael J. Lyle & David A. Hickerson, Products Liability:  Chinese-
Made Goods, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 18, 2008, at 15, col.1. 
 79. Jones & Batson, supra note 76. 
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1. Validity of Arbitration Clauses 
As jurisdiction of arbitration is based on mutual agreement of 
the parties and enforcement may require state action, the validity of 
an arbitration clause is itself the subject of considerable litigation. 
When addressing the validity of arbitration clauses in the PRC, first 
and foremost it is recommended that business people—and their law-
yers—expressly state arbitration as their preferred method of dispute 
resolution and that this stipulation be included in their contracts.  
This is because it is nearly impossible for parties to agree on arbitra-
tion after a dispute has arisen. 
When a dispute arises between a foreign entity and a Chinese 
company, parties are not under a requirement to select an arbitral tri-
bunal based in the PRC.  Rather, they can choose an arbitral tribunal 
from anywhere.  In fact, they do not even have to choose Chinese law 
to govern the dispute.80  Parties should be aware, however, that Ar-
ticle 16 of the PRC Arbitration Law states that the chosen arbitration 
clause must clearly state a specific name of an arbitration tribunal 
(zhongcai weiyuanhui).81  Failing to name a specific body or leaving 
any ambiguity in the intention expressed in the clause will likely re-
sult in unintended consequences.  Article 18 of the PRC Arbitration 
Law states that the failure to name a specific arbitration commission 
could result in invalidation of the clause, thus negating the intention 
to arbitrate and leaving the parties with only the courts for pursuit of 
their claims.82 
An example of this problem can be seen in one case concern-
ing a dispute over the parties’ right to elect the rules of the Paris-
based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to govern its dis-
 
 80. It is not necessary to choose Chinese law to govern disputes arising from contracts 
between Chinese and foreign entities, except in Sino-foreign venture agreements and certain 
PRC mining and oil exploration contracts.  Report by David Livdahl, Partner, Corporate 
Department, Paul Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, International Arbitration in the PRC 
(2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Livdahl 2006]. 
 81. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhongcai fa [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective September 1, 1995), art. 16, 
translated in 34 I.L.M. 1650 (1995) (P.R.C.) (“An arbitration agreement shall include 
arbitration clauses concluded in a contract, and agreements on arbitration petition that are 
reached in writing before or after a dispute.  An arbitration agreement shall contain the 
following particulars:  (1) an indication of the intention to apply for arbitration; (2) the 
arbitrable matters; and (3) the selected arbitration commission.”). 
 82. Id. art. 18 (“Where an arbitration agreement contains no or unclear provisions, the 
parties may reach a supplementary agreement.  Where no such supplementary agreement can 
be reached, the arbitration agreement shall be void.”). 
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pute.83  In this case, the arbitration clause stated that all disputes 
would be settled under the rules of arbitration of the ICC.  However, 
the clause failed to specify the arbitral institution that should hear the 
dispute.  As a result of this oversight, the Haikou Municipal Interme-
diate People’s Court held the clause to be invalid; reasoning that wil-
lingness to use the ICC rules was not the same as choosing the ICC 
arbitral commission because these rules could be applied by other ar-
bitral bodies.84  Likewise, in the case of Guanghope v. Mirant, the 
Supreme People’s Court found that an arbitration clause was invalid 
because the parties had not expressly named an arbitral commis-
sion.85  To prevent this unintended result from reoccurring, the ICC 
has now amended its arbitration clause from its original wording to 
address those disputes that will be heard in China.  It now reads: 
All disputes arising out of or in connection with the 
present contract shall be submitted to the International 
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce and shall be finally settled under the Rules 
of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Com-
merce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accor-
dance with the said Rules.86 
It is worth noting, however, that the PRC’s position on the validity of 
these arbitration clauses was widely criticized.87 
In the wake of these criticisms, the Supreme People’s Court 
drafted a set of rules to deal with the problems presented.  The draft 
was referred to as the Several Provisions on People’s Court Dealing 
with Cases of Foreign-related Arbitration and Foreign Arbitration 
(Several Provisions).88  They stated that where “the parties only pro-
vide that the arbitration rules of a certain arbitration institution shall 
 
 83. See generally Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, ICC 01/2009, Jan. 
1, 2008, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/ 
rules_arb_english.pdf. 
 84. David Livdahl & Xiaodan Qin, ICC Arbitration Administered in China, 2006 
ASIAN DISP. REV. 49, 50, available at http://hkmc.hk/HKIAC/pdf/Further%20Readings/ 
ADR%20April%202006.pdf. 
 85. Alfred B. Adams, III et al., International Arbitration as a Means for Dispute 
Resolution with Chinese Exporters, CHINA NEWSL. (Holland and Knight LLP, Tampa, Fla.), 
Jan. 23, 2008, 
http://www.hklaw.com/id24660/PublicationId2341/ReturnId31/contented50261/. 
 86. Int’l Chamber of Commerce, ICC Standard and Suggested Clauses for Dispute 
Resolution Services, Arbitration in Mainland China, http://www.iccwbo.org/court/ 
arbitration/id4114/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 87. Livdahl & Qin, supra note 84, at 49. 
 88. Id. at 50. 
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be applicable and fail to provide that the arbitration shall be  con-
ducted by that arbitration institution, the people’s courts shall deter-
mine  that the arbitration institution whose arbitration rules are re-
ferred to has jurisdiction over the case.”89  Despite the fact that this 
draft has yet to be made legally binding in the PRC, courts have al-
ready begun using it to guide their decisions.  A court in Xiamen 
ruled valid a provision that required use of the ICC rules of arbitra-
tion and stated that the place of arbitration shall be in Beijing, but 
failed to name a specific body.90   This ambiguity in intent might 
normally have resulted in the invalidation of the clause.  However, in 
this case it was upheld.91 
2. The Enforcement of CIETAC and Foreign Arbitration 
Awards 
The prospect of state enforcement is a lynchpin of arbitration. 
In a 2008 article, Washington-based practitioners Michael Lyle and 
David Hickerson note: 
CIETAC has disadvantages for a U.S. company, in-
cluding the fact that proceedings are in Chinese unless 
the parties agree otherwise; the quality of arbitrators is 
uneven; and the evidentiary procedures and filing 
deadlines are sometimes ignored.  Nonetheless, while 
arbitrating in China poses obstacles, the enforceability 
of an award increases the chances for recovery.92 
Likewise, Fiona D’Souza concluded her own study of enforcement, 
noting that the Supreme People’s Court has recently “issued three In-
terpretations and Directives notable for their contribution towards 
improving the recognition process.”93 
Nevertheless, there is still the outstanding issue that some ar-
bitral awards are not being enforced by the courts, despite the fact 
that China is party to the New York Convention.  Here we will ex-
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.; see also Livdahl 2006, supra note 80, at 11–12 (citing Xiamen Xiang Yu 
Group Corp. v. Mechel Trading AG (Xiamen Interm. People’s Ct., Dec. 14, 2004), 
translated in http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/041214c1.html). 
 91. Livdahl & Qin, supra note 84, at 50; Livdahl 2006, supra note 80, at 11–12. 
 92. Lyle & Hickerson, supra note 78, at 15 (emphasis added). 
 93. Fiona D’Souza, LL.M. Perspective, The Recognition and Enforcement of 
Commercial Arbitral Awards in The People’s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM  INT’L L.J. 
1318, 1331 (2007).  D’Souza argues that efforts over the past ten years have addressed 
factors that have given rise to a situation in which “China’s reputation for enforcement of 
arbitration awards leaves much to be desired.”  Id. at 1318. 
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amine the enforcement of awards made by foreign-related arbitration 
bodies that have been recognized by the PRC.  In the event of non-
compliance by a party with a foreign arbitration award, the other ag-
grieved party can apply to the Intermediate People’s Court for an en-
forcement ruling pursuant to Article 259 of the PRC Civil Procedure 
Law (CPL).94  Additionally, Article 217 of the CPL makes provisions 
for when a party does not adhere to a domestic award.95  However, 
both of these articles stipulate that the commission would have to be 
established according to PRC law, which of course would exclude an 
ICC award, as this arbitral body would not be established in accor-
dance with PRC law, thus excluding enforcement of these awards.96  
While it may be argued that Article 269 of the CPL should also pro-
vide some protection for the enforcement of domestic awards via the 
New York Convention,97 in practice the Notice of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Implementation of the New York Convention 
restricts its application to awards made in other contracting states and 
does not apply to those made in the PRC.98 
In 2001, Randall Peerenboom calculated enforcement rates 
based on a study of seventy-two foreign and CIETAC arbitral award 
cases decided from 1991 to 1999.99  He found that fifty-two percent 
of all foreign awards and forty-seven percent of all CIETAC awards 
were enforced.100  In fact these findings improve once we take into 
account that, of the thirty-seven cases that were not enforced, almost 
half were due to lack of assets on the part of the respondent.101  Pee-
renboom’s study of awards clearly indicates that the enforcement of 
foreign awards during this period was not as bleak as some had spe-
culated.  For those who speculate that local protectionism (guanxi) 
affects the enforceability of awards, the study found that while sixty 
percent of parties thought this to be the case, in fact there was little 
difference in the enforceability rate of cases where protectionism was 
absent with those cases where protectionism was present.102  Howev-
 
 94. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo minshi susong fa [Civil Procedure Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 
1991), art. 259, LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (P.R.C.). 
 95. Id. art. 217. 
 96. See Livdahl & Qin, supra note 84, at 50–51. 
 97. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 94, art. 269. 
 98. Livdahl & Qin, supra note 84, at 50–51. 
 99. Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts:  An Empirical Study of Enforcement 
of Arbitral Award in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 252 (2001). 
 100. Id. at 263.  For purposes of his study, “enforced” meant that some amount was 
recovered, even if that amount was a mere one percent of the award amount.  Id. at 267. 
 101. Id. at 266–67. 
 102. The enforceability rate in the absence of local protectionism was sixty-one percent, 
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er, while local protectionism may not affect enforcement per se, it 
may have the effect of causing delays or difficulties for the parties 
involved.103 
In a survey of 488 respondents carried out by Veron Hung, 
forty-six percent said they would petition their local government if 
they felt that their claims were rejected without a valid reason.104  
However it was pointed out that they would proceed with legal action 
once they were sure that their own connections with higher govern-
ment agencies could protect them,105 thereby contributing to the pre-
valence of local protectionism.  This attitude is reflected in what is 
described by Hung as the “three nots” (san bu): those who do not 
bring suit because they are fearful of government backlash, those 
who do not sue because of cost and those who do not bring suit be-
cause they lack knowledge of legal matters.106 
Peerenboom also identified factors that may affect the en-
forcement of awards:  the role of the Party, the lack of authority of 
the courts and the competence of the judiciary.107  Some have argued 
that interference by the Party has been one of the largest stumbling 
blocks to the independence of the judiciary.108  Li Yayun conducted 
research in this area and concluded that Party interference ranged 
from controlling the nomination process for judges to influencing the 
outcomes of decisions.109  She argued that it is not unheard of for a 
judge to be removed if she or he does not provide a desired outcome 
in a case and to be replaced with someone who will.110  More recent-
ly, the Party claims to have introduced measures for reform and to 
promote judicial fairness (sifa gongzheng) and the rule of law in Chi-
na.  In particular, it points to Shanghai as an example of a city 
 
while the enforceability rate in the presence of local protectionism was fifty-four percent. Id. 
at 276. 
 103. Id. at 277. 
 104. Veron Mei-Ying Hung, Judicial Reform in China:  Lessons from Shanghai at 5 
(Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Carnegie Paper No. 58, 2005), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP58.Hung.FINAL.pdf. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Veron  Mei-Ying  Hung, China’s WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial 
Review:  Impact on Legal and Political Reform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 85–90 (2004). 
 107. Peerenboom, supra note 99, at 284–87, 294–301. 
 108. Mei Ying Gechlik (Veron Hung), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
The Chinese Communist Party’s Leadership and Judicial  Independence (Oct. 29, 2003), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=650. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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achieving “outstanding . . . judicial work, court reform, and contin-
gent building.”111 
Hung argues that there are several reasons why issues such as 
guanxi and san bu may not appear to have had as significant an im-
pact on judicial matters in Shanghai as in the rest of the country.112  
She notes that, in 1998, less than one percent of the 20,000 cases ex-
amined were found to be linked to guanxi.113  First, Shanghai has re-
ceived more than half of the national budget allocated by the Party to 
provide legal aid services; in addition to this, residents of the city are 
overall more affluent and more knowledgeable about their legal 
rights.114  Without the relevant data, it is difficult to draw specific 
conclusions as to the reasons why some awards are not enforced and 
whether or not factors such as government interference and local pro-
tectionism can affect enforcement.  However, the study does demon-
strate that the problem of enforcement cannot be looked at in isola-
tion.  Thus, it cannot be institutional policies alone that will shape the 
role of contract law in the years to come; this will also depend on the 
public’s attitude and perception of these laws. 
3. CIETAC Should Not Use Its Own Personnel as Arbitrators 
One of Jerome Cohen’s principal criticisms of CIETAC’s 
practices is that the association frequently allows its own full-time 
personnel to serve as arbitrators.115  In some cases they are even cho-
sen as a presiding arbitrator.116  This practice is troubling, especially 
for foreign parties using CIETAC’s services, as it may create poten-
tial conflicts of interest.117  CIETAC defends itself by stating that al-
though it does use its own personnel as arbitrators, such personnel are 
highly skilled law graduates.118  In addition, CIETAC asserts that it 
generally does not use these personnel unless parties fail to make an 
 
 111. Veron Mei-Ying Hung, supra note 104, at 3 (citing People’s Courts  Completed 
Most Reform Tasks – China’s Chief Justice, BBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 
(March 12, 2003)). 
 112. Id. at 9–10. 
 113. Id. at 9. 
 114. Id. at 5–7. 
 115. Cohen, supra note 78, at 32. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. LIJUN CAO, CIETAC AS A FORUM FOR RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Cao%231%23.pdf. 
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appointment of their own and, in any case, that these personnel are 
only used in disputes involving relatively small claims.119 
Cohen also argues that the presiding arbitrator in cases in-
volving foreign entities should be from a third country unless the par-
ties agree to allow otherwise.120   CIETAC’s new rules do allow for 
an arbitrator not listed on the panel to serve, but this must be done 
with the permission of the Chairman of CIETAC.121  Arbitrators cho-
sen from within China must satisfy one of the criteria set out in Ar-
ticle 13 of the Arbitration Law: 
(1) to have been engaged in arbitration work for at 
least eight years; 
(2) to have worked as a lawyer for at least eight years; 
(3) to have served as a judge for at least eight years; 
(4) to have been engaged in legal research or legal 
education, possessing a senior professional title; or 
(5) to have acquired the knowledge of law, engaged in 
the professional work in the field of economy and 
trade, etc., possessing a senior professional title or 
having an equivalent professional level.122 
 
In contrast, if an arbitrator is chosen from outside China, Ar-
ticle 67 merely states, “A foreign-related arbitration commission may 
appoint its arbitrators from among foreign nationals with expertise in 
the fields of law, economic relations and trade, science and technolo-
gy, etc.”123  When parties cannot agree on a Chair, the current proce-
dure is for a Chair to be chosen from the official list; more often than 
not this will be a Chinese arbitrator.124  In order to promote impartial-
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Cohen, supra note 78, at 33. 
 121. Jerome Cohen, Letter to the Editor, CIETAC’s Integrity, 168 FAR E. ECON. REV. 4–
5 (2005); see Zhongguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Zhongcai Guize (2005) 
[Arbitration Rules of the China Int’l Econ. & Trade Arbitration Comm’n (2005 version)] 
(revised and adopted by the China Chamber for International Commerce, Jan. 11, 2005, 
effective May 1, 2005), art. 21(2),  available at http://cn.cietac.org/rules/rules.pdf (P.R.C.) 
[hereinafter CIETAC Arbitration Rules] (“Where the parties have agreed to appoint 
arbitrators from outside of the CIETAC’s Panel of Arbitrators, the arbitrators so appointed 
by the parties or nominated according to the agreement of the parties may act as co-
arbitrator, presiding arbitrator or sole arbitrator after the appointment has been confirmed by 
the Chairman of the CIETAC in accordance with the law.”). 
 122. Arbitration Law, supra note 81, art. 13. 
 123. Id. art. 67. 
 124. Livdahl, supra note 48, at 106. 
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ity—and the comforting appearance of impartiality—we urge the ap-
pointment of Chairs only from third countries. 
Cohen’s concerns remain important.  We hope that examina-
tion of these concerns may have the intended effect of furthering dis-
cussion and ideally lead to improvements on the current regime. 
Meanwhile, CIETAC’s defender, Lijun Cao,125 acknowledges the 
merits of these concerns and argues that CIETAC is working to limit 
their potentially corrupting effects.126  Room clearly remains for ad-
ditional reforms. 
4. Decision-Making and Record-Keeping Needs to Be More 
Transparent 
Another criticism is that CIETAC has no definitive proce-
dures for allowing access to its records of arbitration proceedings.127  
This, however, is generally true for arbitral tribunals in which neither 
briefs nor institutional decisions are routinely made public.128  Less 
typical is CIETAC’s practice of permitting arbitrators to allow staff 
members to draft arbitral awards,129 a practice which is most worri-
some as it erodes the level of confidence that CIETAC hopes to in-
spire.  Cao responds to this criticism by arguing that the role of staff 
members in drafting awards is limited to drafting procedural rulings 
and correspondence under the guidance of the arbitrators.130  Howev-
er, CIETAC concedes that until 2000 and sometime thereafter, staff 
members were allowed to draft arbitral awards.131 
The need for arbitral awards to be published in order to pro-
vide greater transparency has also been expressed, yet CIETAC rules 
do not expressly address this issue.132  Still, CIETAC does allow for 
some awards to be published on an ad hoc basis, such as decisions 
contained in the CISG Database at Pace University School of Law’s 
 
 125. Until recently, Lijun Cao was an arbitrator and a senior Staff Member of CIETAC. 
 126. LIJUN CAO, supra note 118, at 5, 8. 
 127. See Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions Between Confidentiality and Transparency in 
International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121, 128 (2003). See also Paul Mitchard, 
Is CIETAC Leading Arbitration in Asia into a New Era of Transparency?, in THE ASIA-
PACIFIC ARBITRATION REVIEW 2009:  A GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW SPECIAL REPORT 29, 
29–30 (2009). 
 128. Mitchard, supra note 127, at 29–30. 
 129. Cohen, supra note 78, at 36–37. 
 130. LIJUN CAO, supra note 118, at 6. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Mitchard, supra note 127, at 29–30; CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 121, 
art. 33. 
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Institute of International Law.133  CIETAC has not publicly articu-
lated the criteria it used for selecting which decisions to send to Pace. 
As of March 2009, the CISG Database reported 288 CIETAC arbitra-
tion awards, most issued before 2002.134  However, CIETAC has of-
fered no information about how these decisions were selected for re-
porting.135  Although this ambiguity is not ideal for the purposes of 
scrutinizing the body of CIETAC awards, it does offer more transpa-
rency than is available to those seeking to assess the work of other 
major tribunals.  For example, the Arbitration Institute of the Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce only had three reported awards on the 
CISG Database and even the Paris-based ICC had only reported se-
venty-one awards.136  Based on this sort of comparison, Kritzer con-
cludes that CIETAC is on the forefront of transparency.137 
5. CIETAC Administrative Fees Are Higher than Those of 
Other Institutions 
CIETAC’s website boasts: “As an international arbitration in-
stitution, the CIETAC arbitration fees are relatively lower than other 
major international arbitration institutions.”138  Despite this claim 
however, many have argued that in cases where the amount exceeds 
$100 million, the fees paid to CIETAC are exorbitant when com-
pared to other arbitral institutions.139  For example, a claim in the 
amount of $500 million would result in an administrative fee to 
 
 133. Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG Database, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 134. Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG  Database, 
CIETAC Arbitration Awards, Mar. 5, 2009, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/CIETAC- 
awards.html.  Although additional awards were released in December 2009, they have not 
been incorporated into the analysis here.  See Pace Law School Institute of International 
Commercial Law, CISG Database, CIETAC Arbitration Awards, Dec. 4, 2009, 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/CIETAC-awards.html. 
 135. See id.  There are hundreds of cases heard by CIETAC each year involving the 
CISG; even allowing for the three-year rule of non-publication in the case of appeals, this is 
not the complete picture. 
 136. See Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG Database, 
Country Case Schedule, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2010). 
 137. Kritzer, supra note 21, at 263. 
 138. CIETAC, Introduction, supra note 18. 
 139. It is worth noting, however, that CIETAC’s fees are comparable with those of its 
competitors in cases where the disputed amount is less than U.S. $3 million.  Livdahl 2006, 
supra note 80, at 8. All dollar figures are U.S. dollars. 
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CIETAC of approximately $2.5 million.140  Arbitrating the same 
claim at the ICC would result in an administrative fee of $88,800.141  
One could conclude that this disparity in costs is another reason for 
business people to avoid arbitration in China.142  Moreover, despite 
its relatively high fees, CIETAC’s arbitrators are among the lowest 
paid in the arbitral community.143  Much like other arbitral bodies, 
such as the ICC or the Hong Kong International Arbitration Commis-
sion, CIETAC calculates arbitrators’ fees based on the claim amount.  
However, the fees that CIETAC paid to its arbitrators are calculated 
at a significantly lower rate than these other organizations,144 which 
raises the issue of whether the best foreign arbitrators would agree to 
serve on a CIETAC panel. 
CIETAC has responded to these criticisms by stating that 
these matters are not within its control because, as of 2002, a gov-
ernment regulation requires all arbitral bodies to submit revenues and 
expenditures to the Ministry of Finance for approval.145  Therefore, in 
order to compensate foreign arbitrators for the low pay, a special fee 
is levied to the party who appoints this arbitrator, which is intended 
to cover fees and expenses.146  This solution has not proven to be sa-
tisfactory as it has led to Chinese arbitrators claiming that it is unfair 
for foreign arbitrators to be paid more for doing the same amount of 
work.  Moreover, business people may be dissuaded from using 
CIETAC once they find out that they would have to bear the costs of 
the special fees.  It is also worth questioning how the proceedings can 
be fair and impartial if a party who requests a foreign arbitrator has to 
pay more for this service.  Furthermore, it has been argued that be-
cause Chinese arbitrators are paid less than their foreign counterparts 
that they may not be as diligent in their approach to arbitration; 
CIETAC vociferously refutes this claim.147  In sum, CIETAC’s opa-
que financial arrangements detract from the desirability of employing 
its services, even if they generally result in lower bills. 
 
 140. Id. at 14. 
 141. Id. 
 142. The chances of CIETAC handling a case where the disputed amount is more than 
U.S. $100 million may be rare but not unheard of; it is also worth noting that we do not have 
the case figures available to determine if CIETAC has handled cases for this amount.  Id. 
 143. LIJUN CAO, supra note 118, at 4. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Jones & Batson, supra note 76. 
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II. CHINA AND THE CISG:  REVIEW OF EXISTING DECISIONS 
DEALING WITH NON-CONFORMING GOODS 
A. Contract Law in China 
Chinese contract law provides the basic and default rules of 
commercial transactions, and therefore the context in which disputes 
must be addressed.  Ten years ago, the PRC replaced the existing 
Foreign Economic Contract Law148 with a unified contract code 
known as the Contract Law of the PRC.149   The new law made no 
distinction between Chinese and foreign companies in an effort to en-
sure equal and fair treatment of both parties.150  If the contract con-
tains a foreign element, i.e., the contracting parties are foreign na-
tionals or the subject matter is in a foreign country, then the parties 
can decide which jurisdiction’s law will govern their contract.151  
This decision generally also includes a choice about whether disputes 
will be submitted to a Chinese or foreign arbitral institution.152 
B. The Applicability of the CISG in China and the Relevance of 
Chinese Contract Law 
As noted above, the CISG has been in force in China since 
1988 (some eleven years prior to enactment of the Contract Law).  
 
 148. Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Shewai Jingji Hetongfa [Foreign Economic Contract 
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 21, 1985, effective 
July 1, 1985), translated in 24 I.L.M. 799 (1985) (P.R.C.). 
 149. Contract Law, supra note 57. 
 150. China’s Contract Law to Take Effect from October 1, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Mar. 
22, 1999. 
 151. Contract Law, supra note 57, art. 126 (“Parties to a foreign-related contract may 
select the applicable law for resolution of a contractual dispute, except as otherwise provided 
by law.  Where parties to the foreign-related contract fail to select the applicable law, the 
contract shall be governed by the law of the country with the closest connection thereto.”). 
 152. Id. art. 128 (“The parties may resolve a contractual dispute through settlement or 
mediation.  Where the parties do not wish to, or are unable to, resolve such dispute through 
settlement or mediation, the dispute may be submitted to the relevant arbitration institution 
for arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement between the parties.  Parties to a 
foreign-related contract may apply to a Chinese arbitration institution or another arbitration 
institution for arbitration.  Where the parties did not conclude an arbitration agreement, or 
the arbitration agreement is invalid, either party may bring a suit to the People’s Court.  The 
parties shall perform the judgments, arbitration awards or mediation agreements which have 
taken legal effect; if a party refuses to perform, the  other  party may request the People’s 
Court for enforcement.”). 
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Under the terms of China’s ratification of the Convention, in cases 
where both parties have their place of business in member states, the 
CISG will apply unless it is excluded.  The CISG also applies if the 
contract expressly requires it.  However, if the foreign contracting 
party is not from a signatory to the CISG, and in absence of the par-
ties choosing a governing law, the contract will be governed by the 
Contract Law.  Even though it is argued that the CISG will prevail in 
the event of a conflict between the CISG and the Contract Law, par-
ties are advised to make specific provisions in their contracts as to the 
law governing disputes. 
The use of the CISG as the governing law for contractual dis-
putes can be advantageous to the parties.  First, it provides a nominal-
ly level playing field, as both parties have equal access to information 
contained in the Convention.  The other advantage is that the CISG 
has had more years to develop than the Chinese contract code, argua-
bly allowing for more certainty in decision-making than that of the 
Chinese laws. 
While this article will not proceed with an in-depth examina-
tion of the Contract Law, it is worth noting a few relevant points for 
businesspeople and their legal advisors to take into consideration. 
First, the Contract Law was intended to unify and supersede all pre-
vious legislation dealing with contractual issues.153  During this draft-
ing process, other contractual legal instruments, both foreign and in-
ternational, were given due consideration.  In particular, the CISG 
and the UNIDROIT Principles were used as guidelines.154  As a con-
sequence of this ambitious effort, the Contract Law offers a wider 
scope than some CISG provisions.  For example, it covers more than 
one type of contract, not merely contracts for the sale of goods.155  In 
addition, it relaxes the requirement of the written contractual form;156 
under the Convention, China declared itself not bound by Article 11 
of the CISG which deals with this issue.157  Finally, the Contract Law 
provides for specific performance as an express remedy under the 
 
 153. See Ding Ding, China and CISG, in CISG AND CHINA:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 25 
(Michael R. Will ed., 1999). 
 154. Id. at 33. 
 155. Id. at 33–34. 
 156. Contract Law, supra note 57, art. 10. 
 157. CISG, supra note 15, art. 11 (“A contract of sale need not be concluded in or 
evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form.  It may be 
proved by any means, including witnesses.”); Pace Law School Institute of International 
Commercial Law, CISG Database, CISG: Participating Countries – China (PRC), 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-China.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
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contract,158 whereas its CISG counterpart, Article 28, restricts availa-
bility of this remedy.159 
Although some commentators question whether the Contract 
Law poses a threat to the employment of the CISG in the PRC, we 
believe that the two instruments may be complementary.160  The fact 
that the Contract Law provisions are similar to the CISG aids in in-
terpreting and drawing a deeper understanding of the Convention 
among those people working with both bodies of law.  For example, 
we see no reason why one interpretation of a provision in the Con-
tract Law should cloud interpretation of the uniform international 
sales law.  Even though they may have similar or even identical 
terms, lawyers understand that they may be read differently depend-
ing on the jurisprudence of the particular body of law.  To the extent 
that this has not been the case, and tribunals or courts have been us-
ing the jurisprudence of one body of law to fill in gaps (or even to 
“correct mistakes”) in the other, it seems to be a one-way street: Chi-
nese courts are using CISG jurisprudence to interpret the Contract 
Law.  Either way, we do not see any evidence that the harmonized 
interpretation of the CISG has been undermined. 
C. Overview of History and Scope of CISG 
Prior to commencing an examination of the CISG and how it 
has been applied by CIETAC in the cases of defective products, we 
pause briefly to review its history, scope and purpose.  In 1966, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations established the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).  This 
working group reviewed previous international sales instruments in 
order to create a new convention; the results of these efforts were 
completed in 1978.161  The CISG was signed in Vienna in 1980 and 
entered into force in 1988 upon being ratified by the required number 
 
 158. Contract Law, supra note 57, art. 107. 
 159. CISG, supra note 15, art. 28 (“If, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention, one party is entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, 
a court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do 
so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this 
Convention.”). 
 160. See Ding Ding, supra note 153, at 36–37. 
 161. The previous sales laws were the Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods 
(ULIS) and Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(ULF).  See Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG Database, 
Antecedents to the CISG, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/antecedents.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
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of parties.162  As of this writing, some seventy-four States had 
adopted the CISG.163  Over three-quarters of all international sales 
transactions are conducted between parties based in a Contracting 
State.164 
Once ratified by a Contracting State, the CISG takes prece-
dence over domestic law and choice of law rules in regards to con-
tracts for the international sale of goods.165  The CISG has 101 ar-
ticles and is divided into four principal parts.  Part I details the 
Convention’s scope and contains general provisions applicable to the 
rest of the Convention.166  Part II is concerned with rules for the for-
mation of contracts of sale.167  Part III deals with the rules governing 
the substantive obligations of the buyers and sellers.168  Part IV con-
tains the final provisions on adherence to and ratification of the Con-
vention by Contracting States, including any reservations made in re-
gard to the Convention’s applicability to a Contracting State.169 
According to Article 1(1)(a), the “Convention applies to con-
tracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are 
in different States.”170  The CISG also applies “when the rules of pri-
vate international law lead to the application of the law of a Contract-
ing State.”171  It is important to note that the CISG is a set of rules for 
 
 162. See UNCITRAL, Status:  1980 – United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/ 
1980CISG_status.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 163. Id. 
 164. It is important to note that this does not mean that over three-quarters of all 
international sales contracts are governed by the CISG.  Those that are excluded are based 
on application of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5.  However, the CISG can be applied through Article 
1(1)(b) where the parties do not have their places of business in different Contracting States 
and the rules of private international law of the forum can also lead to the application of the 
CISG.  Thus, the number of contracts governed by the Convention is greater than just those 
covered under Article 1(1)(a), but again subject to the exclusions listed above.  Note, though, 
that Article 1(1)(b) does not apply to the PRC.  See Pace Law School Institute of 
International Commercial Law, CISG Database, CISG:  Participating Countries – China 
(PRC), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-China.html (last visited Feb. 10, 
2010). 
 165. JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA 11–13 (2d ed. 2004). 
 166. See CISG, supra note 15, arts. 1–13. 
 167. Id. arts. 14–24. 
 168. Id. arts. 25–88. 
 169. Id. arts. 89–101. 
 170. Id. art. 1(1)(a). 
 171. Id. art. 1(1)(b).  Note that this provision is not applicable to the PRC.  See Pace 
Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG Database, CISG:  
Participating Countries – China (P.R.C.), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/ 
cntries-China.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
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business, not consumer transactions.172  In addition to this, certain 
types of sales contracts are specifically excluded under the Conven-
tion.173  Questions involving the validity of the contract are also out-
side the scope of the Convention, as is the effect which the contract 
may have on property rights in the goods sold,174 and any liability of 
the seller for defective goods causing death or personal injury to any 
person.175  One of the notable features of the Convention is that it al-
lows contracting parties the ability to derogate from176 or exclude its 
provisions altogether.177 
D. CISG and Non-Conformity of Goods 
As this article deals with unsafe products produced by Chi-
nese manufacturers, it is important to establish the issues of noncon-
formity which can be covered by the CISG.  Article 35 of the CISG, 
relating to conformity, states: 
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of the 
quantity, quality and description required by the con-
tract and which are contained or packaged in the man-
ner required by the contract. 
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, 
the goods do not conform with the contract unless 
they: 
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the 
same description would ordinarily be used; 
 
 172. CISG, supra note 15, art. 2(a); LOOKOFSKY, supra note 165, at 17. 
 173. For example, contracts involving the sale of securities, ships, vessels, hovercraft or 
aircraft, and electricity are not governed by the Convention. CISG, supra note 15, art. 2. 
 174. Id. art. 4 (“This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and 
the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.  In 
particular, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention, it is not concerned 
with:  (a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage; (b) the effect 
which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.”). 
 175. Id. art. 5 (“This Convention does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or 
personal injury caused by the goods to any person.”). 
 176. Id. art. 6 (permitting derogation under the Convention, with the one exception of 
art. 12). 
 177. Id.  Unlike its predecessor, the ULIS, the CISG did not specifically indicate that 
implied exclusions were permissible, thus there is doubt on the issue.  See [1968–1970] Y.B. 
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 168, U.N. Doc  A/CN.9/SER.A/1970; COMMENTARY ON 
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 86 (Peter 
Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2005).  Parties are 
advised to make their intentions clear to avoid unwanted results. 
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(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or im-
pliedly made known to the seller at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, except where the circums-
tances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was 
unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller’s skill and 
judgment; 
(c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has 
held out to the buyer as a sample or model; 
(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for 
such goods or, where there is no such manner, in a 
manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods. 
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to 
(d) of the preceding paragraph for any lack of confor-
mity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion of 
the  contract the buyer knew or could not have been 
unaware of such lack of conformity.178 
 
The first part of the provision, Article 35(1), gives authority 
to the terms of the contract and the stipulations of the parties.179  If 
there is no express agreement, then general provisions of the Conven-
tion may be used to ascertain the intentions of the parties.  These 
provisions include Articles 8 and 9, governing the parties’ intentions 
and trade usages, respectively.180  Regarding which statements are 
capable of becoming terms of the contract, some commentators argue 
that the CISG does not distinguish between different types of state-
ments, as may be the case in certain legal systems.181  The second 
part of the provision, Article 35(2), deals with the meaning of con-
formity under the CISG.182  Unless the parties have disclaimed liabil-
ity or have agreed to their own standards as to the fitness and quality 
of the goods, this part of the provision will apply.183  Article 35(2)(a) 
 
 178. CISG, supra note 15, art. 35. 
 179. Id. art. 35(1). 
 180. Id. arts. 8–9 (discussing treatment of the parties’ intentions and trade usages, 
respectively). 
 181. CISG, supra note 15, art. 35.  See for example the U.S. law distinction between 
representations and promises.  FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL 
SALES LAW 140 (1992), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
enderlein.html. 
 182. CISG, supra note 15, art. 35(2). 
 183. Some legal systems do not allow for disclaimers of this kind.  See, e.g., Sale of 
Goods Act, 1979, c. 54, §§ 13–14 (Eng.) (Description and quality of the goods cannot be 
contracted out if one party is a consumer; if the parties are two businesses, then the 
disclaimer must satisfy the reasonableness test under the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, 
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states that goods must be fit for their ordinary use.184  Accordingly, 
defects that affect the everyday use of such goods would render them 
non-conforming.  Standards of conformity are judged according to 
the standards established in the seller’s country unless the buyer has 
made known to the seller any specifications which must be adhered 
to in order for the goods to be saleable.  The final part of Article 35 
relieves the seller of any liability if the buyer knew or could have 
been aware of the non-conformities listed in Article 35(2)(a)–(d).185  
An example of this is where the seller had in the past sold goods of 
poor quality to the buyer without complaints, or if the price corres-
ponds to the price generally paid for poor quality goods.186 
The Convention is not concerned with whether the goods 
meet the safety standards of the buyer’s country as long as they oth-
erwise remain fit for their purpose.187  Safety standards are matters to 
be settled within public law and are thus outside the realm of con-
formity for the purposes of the Convention.  An example of this can 
be seen in the New Zealand Mussels case from 1995, in which the 
German Supreme Court held that even though the mollusks in ques-
tion contained a cadmium concentration exceeding the limit recom-
mended by the German health authority, the Swiss seller in this case 
was not in breach of contract.188  The court based its conclusion on 
the reasoning that the mussels were still edible and that Article 35(2) 
(dealing with conformity of the goods) did not place an obligation on 
the seller to supply goods that conform to all statutory or other public 
provisions in force in the buyer’s country, unless the same provisions 
exist in the seller’s country as well.189  Only if the buyer had in-
formed the seller about such provisions or relied on the seller’s ex-
pert knowledge, or the seller had knowledge of the provisions due to 
special circumstances, would the seller have been liable for breach of 
contract.190 
 
c. 50, § 6 (Eng.)).  However, the CISG does not deal with validity of clauses, so this matter 
would have to be settled within domestic laws.  See CISG, supra note 15, art. 4. 
 184. CISG, supra note 15, art. 35. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. (discussing terms and phrases). 
 187. But see ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 181, at 143 (arguing that while the 
fitness of the goods is generally determined by the seller’s country, safety considerations 
must only be considered if the buyer informs the seller in advance). 
 188. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 8, 1995, 129 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 75 (F.R.G.), translated in 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html [hereinafter New Zealand Mussels 
Case]. 
 189. Id.; see also CISG, supra note 15, art. 35(2)(b). 
 190. New Zealand Mussels Case, supra note 188. 
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The New Zealand Mussels decision raised many questions 
within the CISG community as to the impact of its notably narrow in-
terpretation of non-conformity.  It is important to bear in mind that 
framework conventions such as the CISG are designed so that by 
their very nature, not every issue will be expressly settled within its 
wording.  Rather we look to decisions and underlying principles of 
the Convention to settle these internal gaps (praeter legem), and in 
fact the Convention directs us to do so under Article 7.191  The issue 
of which party’s place of business should determine what public law 
regulations apply is not a matter that is readily resolved based on the 
plain language of the Convention.  The German Supreme Court de-
cided in favor of the seller’s place of business.  The main reason for 
the court’s decision is that the seller cannot be expected to know the 
public law regulations of a country not his own unless the same laws 
apply in the seller’s country, the buyer informs the seller of these 
regulations,192 or if due to “special circumstances,” such as the exis-
tence of a branch office of the seller in the buyer’s country, the seller 
knew or should have known about the regulations.193 
This view of non-conformity by the German courts can be 
compared with that of the court in Medical Marketing v. Internazio-
nale Medico Scientifica, which involved a dispute between a U.S. 
buyer and an Italian seller over the burden of complying with U.S. 
governmental safety standards.194  The dispute was first heard before 
an arbitral tribunal which held that the defendant had delivered units 
that failed to comply with U.S. safety standards and the goods were 
 
 191. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 7(2) (“Questions concerning matters governed by this 
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be  settled in conformity with the 
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity 
with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.”).  This is opposed 
to intra legem gaps, which under Article 7(2) of the CISG are “filled in by domestic law 
applicable by virtue of the conflict of laws rules of the forum State.”  Lucia Carvalhal Sica, 
Gap-filling in the CISG:  May the UNIDROIT Principles Supplement the Gaps in the 
Convention?, NORDIC J. COM. L., Issue 2006 No. 1, at 3, http://www.njcl.utu.fi/1_2006/ 
article2.pdf. 
 192. Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law in the Decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof 
(Todd J. Fox trans., 2001), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem3.html. 
 193. Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary, Conformity of the Goods and Standards 
Established by Public Law; Treatment of Foreign Court Decision as  Precedent:  Medical 
Marketing International, Inc. v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.r.l., U.S. District Court, 
Eastern District of Louisiana, 17 May 1999 (André Corterier trans., 1999), http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/990517u1.html. 
 194. Med. Mktg. Int’l v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., No. Civ. A. 99-
0380, 1999 WL 311945, at *1 (E.D. La. May 17, 1999). 
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therefore “non-conforming.”195  The seller appealed on the grounds 
that the arbitrators misapplied the CISG by refusing to follow the 
German decision in the Mussels case.196  On appeal, the court noted 
that the arbitrators had carefully considered the German case and had 
concluded that the situation before them fit within an exception rec-
ognized by the German Supreme Court.197  Confirming the arbitral 
award, the court held that the arbitrators had not exceeded their au-
thority in not following the German decision.198  In the court’s opi-
nion, it was noted that the seller was or should have been aware of 
the public law regulations before entering into the contract.199  This 
decision and its rationale were significant for the development of 
CISG jurisprudence because they recognized that courts in different 
jurisdictions are under a duty to consider decisions from other higher 
courts and assess the merits of cases with similar facts.  Although the 
Convention itself does not stipulate a stare decisis value to decisions 
generated under it, Article 7 of the CISG does require that when in-
terpreting the Convention, regard be given to promoting uniformity 
in decision-making.200 
When dealing with issues of non-conformity for reasons of 
public law regulations, it is important to remember that domestic 
regulations often stem from prohibitions and other curtailments that 
are unique and possibly idiosyncratic to the importing country. 
Therefore, it would impose an unfair burden on the seller to require it 
to have knowledge of all these regulations unless one of the excep-
tions listed in the New Zealand Mussels case was applicable or alter-
natively the provisions of Article 35(2)(b) applied.  To avoid these 
problems, contracting parties should allocate these risks expressly. 
E. CIETAC Cases on Non-Conformity of the Goods 
As of May 2009, CIETAC had reported fifty-four internation-
al cases dealing with non-conformity of the goods to the contract.201  
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at *2. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. CISG, supra note 15, art. 7.  See Franco Ferrari, CISG Case Law:  A New 
Challenge for Interpreters?, 17 J.L. & COM. 245 (1999). 
 201. Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG  Database, 
Cases on the CISG by Courts and Arbitral Tribunals of the People’s Republic of China:  
Article 35, Conformity of Goods to Contract, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/PRC-
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The Secretary General of CIETAC (or his designates) selected the 
cases released to Pace for translation and publication.  We have no 
way of knowing the proportion of the total number of CISG cases 
handled by CIETAC, nor can we assume that these cases are repre-
sentative of all CIETAC offices, as the Pace Institute of International 
Commercial Law has yet to receive any cases handled by the 
CIETAC-Shanghai office.202  Nevertheless, based on the available 
decisions, we offer some tentative observations regarding noncon-
formity of the goods and go on to assess the value of the tribunals’ 
reasoning. 
1. General Conformity Issues 
In the Broadcasting Equipment case involving a Canadian 
seller and a Chinese buyer, the buyer alleged that the seller did not 
supply goods in conformity with the contract, as the equipment did 
not adhere to the technical specifications set out in the contract in ac-
cordance with CISG Article 35(1).203  After examining the docu-
ments, the CIETAC arbitral tribunal found that the contract did not 
contain stipulations on function, quality and technical requirements 
on the goods.  However, there was an attachment to the contract 
signed by both parties that stated that the equipment supplied was 
recommended by the seller for the purpose of launching broadcast 
services.  In addition to this, three sets of tests were carried out on the 
equipment; after the third test the equipment was still found to be de-
fective.  The tribunal found in this case that the seller had committed 
a fundamental breach of contract as set out in CISG Article 25 by 
failing to provide conforming goods. 
In this case, the tribunal correctly applied the CISG’s provi-
sions to the facts of the case.  Since the technical documentation was 
not actually contained in the contract itself, but rather in the attach-
ment, the tribunal took into account the relevance of this documenta-
tion in determining the parties’ intentions.  This practice follows 
CISG Article 8, which states that intention can be discerned from 
 
35.html (last visited May 15, 2009). 
 202. E-mail from Albert Kritzer, Executive Secretary of the Institute of  International 
Commercial Law, Pace University School of Law, to Mark R. Shulman, Assistant Dean for 
Graduate Programs / International Affairs, Adjunct Professor of Law, Pace University 
School of Law (Oct. 26, 2008, 09:14 EST) (on file with author). 
 203. CIETAC Arbitration Award of May 22, 1996, (Broadcasting Equipment Case), 
1996 Zhong Guo Guo Ji Jing Ji Mao Yi Zhong Cai Wei Yuan Hui Cai Jue Shu Hui Bian 
[Compilation of CIETAC Arbitration Awards] 1260, translated in http://cisgw3.law.pace. 
edu/ cases/960522c1.html (P.R.C.). 
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“negotiations, any practices which the parties have established be-
tween themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the par-
ties.”204  In other words, the panel applied the terms of the Conven-
tion as Western lawyers would expect, not in any idiosyncratic or 
“Chinese” way.  This decision shows that the tribunal used the provi-
sions of the CISG to determine whether the facts of the case 
amounted to a fundamental breach for non-conformity of the con-
tract.  The Convention’s provisions were not narrowly construed; in-
stead, all applicable circumstances were considered and set out in the 
rationale of the decision. 
2. Issues Relating to the Discovery of the Non-Conformity 
A case involving a U.S. buyer and a Chinese seller for the 
sale of steel flanges also raised the issue of determining nonconfor-
mity in relation to goods.205  Each of the several sales contracts con-
tained terms on quality and examination of the goods and set out an 
obligation for the seller to provide Mill Test Reports describing the 
chemical and heat data of the flanges.206  The goods were subse-
quently re-sold to the buyer’s customers at which point they were 
found to be non-conforming.207  This case is important because it 
calls into question those defects which are not visibly apparent; the 
defects were of a latent nature only discovered a few years after the 
goods were delivered. 
Based on independent expert tests, the tribunal found that the 
flanges were defective and not in conformity with the specifications 
established in the contract.208  The tribunal considered the seller lia-
ble under CISG Article 36(2), as the defective flanges constituted a 
breach of a guarantee that the goods would remain fit for their ordi-
nary purpose.209  However, the tribunal also found that the guarantee 
period was not indefinite and would not extend past the two-year pe-
 
 204. CISG, supra note 15, art. 8(2). 
 205. CIETAC Arbitration Award of Mar. 30, 1999 (Flanges Case), 1999  Zhong Guo 
Guo Ji Jing Ji Mao Yi Zhong Cai Wei Yuan Hui Cai Jue Shu Hui  Bian [Compilation of 
CIETAC Arbitration Awards] 1703, translated in http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
990330c2.html (P.R.C.); see also the companion case CIETAC Arbitration Award of Mar. 
29, 1999, 1999 Zhong Guo Guo Ji Jing Ji Mao Yi Zhong Cai Wei Yuan Hui Cai Jue Shu Hui 
Bian [Compilation of CIETAC Arbitration Awards] 1652, translated in  http://cisgw3.law. 
pace.edu/cases/990329c1.html (P.R.C.). 
 206. Flanges Case, supra note 205. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
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riod set forth in Article 39(2).210  The tribunal concluded that some of 
the defects in this case were defects of which the seller “could not 
have been unaware.”211  This point notwithstanding, the tribunal held 
that Article 40212 did not take precedence over the provisions of Ar-
ticle 39(2).213  The tribunal ruled that the language of Article 39(2) 
bars an indemnity claim beyond the stated two-year period and that 
the buyer was at fault for not discovering the defect sooner, due to 
the fact that the buyer had overstocked and therefore had not used the 
goods before the two-year period expired.214  This ruling in favor of 
the Chinese seller on the relationship between Article 40 and Article 
39(2) might have set a trend that generally benefited sellers. 
The decision in the Flanges case is troubling when compared 
to an earlier case heard by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. 
Facing similar factual circumstances, the Swedish tribunal decided 
that the buyer was not barred from relying on a non-conforming part 
for a machine when the defect was discovered four years after the 
machine was delivered, thereby outside the two-year limitation pe-
riod set in Article 39(2).215  The Stockholm Chamber held that the 
buyer could still rely on the defect to show non-conformity despite 
the two-year limitation because the seller knew that the part required 
for the machine was important to the buyer and did not inform the 
buyer that he had substituted this part for another.  The tribunal rea-
soned that “Article 40 is an expression of the principles of fair trad-
ing that underlie also [sic] many other provisions of the CISG, and it 
is by its very nature a codification of a general principle.”216 
 
 210. Id.; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Case Abstract No. 770:  Flanges Case, 
A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/74 (Apr. 18, 2008) (prepared by Damon Schwartz), available 
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990330c2.html#uab (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 211. Flanges Case, supra note 205. 
 212. CISG, supra note 15, art. 40 (“The seller is not entitled to rely on the provisions of 
articles 38 and 39 if the lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew or could not 
have been unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer.”). 
 213. CISG, supra note 15, art. 39(2) (“In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a 
lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give the seller notice thereof at the latest 
within a period of two years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to 
the buyer, unless this time-limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee.”). 
 214. Flanges Case, supra note 205. 
 215. Beijing Light Auto. Co. v. Connell Ltd. P’ship, Separate Award of June 5, 1998 
(Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce), available at http:// 
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980605s5.html; see Camilla Baasch Andersen, Applying Article 
40 to 39(2) as well as 39(1)—Stockholm vs. Flanges (Mar. 14, 2006), http:// 
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980605s5.html 
 216. See Andersen, supra note 215. 
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In contrast, the CIETAC Flanges tribunal found that the 
“longest time limit to notify of lack of conformity of the goods with 
the contract is ‘within a period two years from the date on which the 
goods were actually handed over to the buyer.’  This is so because 
the restricting words ‘in any event’ are used in Article 39(2).”217  It is 
argued, given the discrepancy in the reasoning of these two arbitral 
bodies, that more explicit rationale should be provided to support 
CIETAC’s decision, which was based on overstocking by the buyer. 
Specifically, if the seller was aware of the defect, should he be re-
lieved of liability even if the defect had been discovered past the two-
year period?218 
The CIETAC decision should have weighed the need for 
sound business practice and fair dealing, not to mention the role of 
good faith, against the need to establish a cut-off period for bringing 
liability of transactions to an end and giving businesses the ability to 
look forward without unnecessary encumbrances.  Article 40 does 
not mention limiting its application to that of Article 39(1); instead it 
should be read to include all of Article 39.219  This is not to say that 
the Stockholm tribunal is correct and CIETAC is wrong; however, if 
the CIETAC tribunal reached its conclusion based on the fact that the 
seller was deemed not to have acted fraudulently, then the rationale 
should have included this reasoning and created a distinction more 
explicitly.  Instead, the result is two differing points of view about 
this specific issue. 
The fact that these tribunals offer differing interpretations of 
the relationship between Article 40 and Article 39(2) poses a non-
trivial threat to the principle of uniform application that underlies the 
 
 217. Id. (citing Flanges Case, supra note 205).  The tribunal here is interpreting the 
wording in its strictest sense. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 44 (an example of the former); see also Vivian 
Grosswald Curran, Cross-References and Editorial Analysis:  Article 40 (June 1997), 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/cross/cross-40.html.  CISG Article 40 and its ULIS 
counterpart are essentially similar in wording; the Tunc commentary  on ULIS states that:  
“In determining that the seller may not rely on the barring of rights provided for in Articles 
38 and 39 if the lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew, or of which he could 
not have been unaware of and did not disclose, Article 40 does no more than sanction a rule 
of good faith.” Id. (citing André Tunc, Commentary on the  Hague Conventions of 1 July 
1964  on International Sale of Goods and the Formation of the Contract of  Sale, in 1 
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE UNIFICATION OF LAW GOVERNING THE  INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS:  RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE  CONFERENCE 355, 376 (1966)). 
Therefore, where Article 40 is applicable, the buyer will not lose remedies provided for 
under the CISG for failure to comply with Article 39.  In this situation Article 39’s notice 
requirements will not apply. 
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successful implementation of the Convention on a global scale.  In 
light of the recent cases dealing with defective products in the PRC 
(in which one may encounter the same issues as failure to give notice 
within the stipulated time period), it is of the essence that the tribun-
als employ rationales based directly on the provisions of the CISG in 
order to justify their decisions.  Thus, the ten-year-old Flanges case 
offers evidence for those who argue that CIETAC is either corrupt, 
less skilled than Western tribunals or biased in favor of either Chi-
nese parties or sellers in general.  At this point, however, their con-
cern seems overblown—or at least premature—because it rests on a 
starkly contrasting Stockholm case to evince one of these flaws.  In 
the absence of the Stockholm opinion for comparison, the Flanges 
case might not itself seem to indicate any bias or flaw. On the other 
hand, even without the Stockholm case as a basis for comparison, it 
is arguable that CIETAC failed to interpret the provisions of Article 
40 correctly, as the wording of this provision is stated to apply to the 
whole of Article 39. 
3. International and Industry Standards 
The next case involved a Dutch seller and a Chinese buyer for 
the sale of old boxboard corrugated carton.  The technical specifica-
tions appended to the contract stipulated with considerable precision 
the minimum content levels that the goods were to contain.220  Upon 
arrival of the goods, the buyer alleged that the content level of the 
goods was not in conformity with the contractual stipulations and that 
the goods could not be used for their purpose of producing brown pa-
per.  The tribunal found that there was no uniform international stan-
dard of quality for old corrugated carton and that, as a consequence, 
the express stipulations of the parties had to be relied upon to prove 
non-conformity of the goods.221 
While the decision of the tribunal is correct in its application 
(i.e., that regard should indeed be given to the express stipulations of 
the parties), the reasoning is somewhat troubling.  The tribunal stated 
that no “uniform international standard of quality” existed within this 
particular industry,222 yet if there were a standard to be found which 
 
 220. CIETAC Arbitration Award of Mar. 8, 1996 (Old Boxboard Corrugated Cartons 
Case), 1996 Zhong Guo Guo Ji Jing Ji Mao Yi Zhong Cai Wei Yuan Hui Cai Jue Shu Hui 
Bian [Compilation of CIETAC Arbitration Awards] 951, translated in 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960308c1.html (P.R.C.). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
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differed from the contractual stipulations, would this supersede the 
parties’ express stipulation?  This decision requires more explanation 
as to the meaning of what defines a “uniform” standard, a term that is 
ambiguous.223  In addition, we argue that, first and foremost, it is the 
express contractual stipulations of the parties which should be given 
consideration; after all this would be the standard on which the 
agreement was formed.  Gap-filling is only appropriate where legiti-
mate gaps exist. 
In a case involving a Czech buyer and a Chinese seller for the 
sale of down jackets and winter coats, the contract stipulated that the 
goods were to be “European style.”224  The buyer alleged that the 
coats did not conform to the terms of the contract, arguing that they 
were not “European style” and that the down content of the coats 
were only twenty percent instead of the thirty percent they had ex-
pected.225  The CIETAC tribunal found that no standard existed that 
determined the meaning of “European style,” and therefore the buyer 
could not rely on this non-existent standard to prove non-
conformity.226  Furthermore, the tribunal decided that the fact that the 
coats only had twenty percent of down instead of thirty percent was 
reflected in the low contract price.227  Thus, the coats were deemed to 
be conforming in this respect by reason of the lower price.228  In con-
trast to this decision, in an earlier case involving the sale of steel cy-
linders, the Chinese seller argued that the contract price was below 
the quoted price for brand-new steel cylinders, and as a result the 
buyer should have expected to receive old cylinders.229  The tribunal 
found that the price of goods could not indicate whether parties in-
 
 223. Andrea Vincze, Conformity of the Goods in the UN Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG)—Overview of CIETAC’s Practice, in SHARING 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, FESTSCHRIFT FOR 
ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 80TH BIRTHDAY 552, 563 (Camilla B. 
Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter eds., 2008). 
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tended to sell brand new goods or not.230  Therefore, the question of 
whether a lower price should be indicative of the quality of the goods 
received would depend on the circumstances of the case, namely the 
purpose for which the goods are bought. 
These two opinions are good examples illustrating the need 
for uniform decisions under the Convention and for the parties them-
selves.  In addressing the issue of uniformity, CIETAC has been de-
scribed as being on the forefront of the interpretation of the CISG.231  
It follows that CIETAC has to be able to provide decisions that cor-
rectly interpret the Convention and provide a clear rationale for cases 
with similar facts.  In addition, parties, in particular buyers as they 
are the most affected, need to apply the caveat emptor principle when 
entering into contracts.  Specifically, they need to be aware of the 
various factors that may bar their claim to seeking a remedy for non-
conforming goods.  The guiding principle should be to draft contracts 
with clear specifications for the goods, as spending more on contrac-
tual negotiation could help to reduce litigation costs later on.  We are 
encouraged by the notion that the publication of decisions will foster 
greater uniformity of interpretation in the Convention.  Indeed, we 
would even speculate that CIETAC is releasing these decisions for 
publication in order to create circumstances in which its panels can—
and do—issue more uniform decisions. 
F. Conclusions on Case Analysis 
After an examination of the entire body of cases made availa-
ble by CIETAC, and despite some of the problems raised by the most 
notable cases which we discuss above, we tentatively conclude that 
there is no overt evidence of a pro-China bias on the part of the 
CIETAC panels.  A statistical analysis is telling.  Out of 290 cases, 
the claimants were awarded damages ninety percent of the time; on 
average the claimant recovered about sixty-five percent of the dis-
puted amount.232  Chinese claimants in these cases were successful 
ninety percent of the time, whereas when a Chinese party acted as 
respondent, they were only successful eight percent of the time.233  
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Moreover, the only reference made to corruption was in a case in-
volving a Chinese claimant and a U.S. respondent for the sale of en-
gines. The U.S. seller alleged that, 
we have reason to believe that the [Buyer] intentional-
ly avoided using the inspection agency stipulated in 
the contract, bent the law for its own benefit, and prac-
ticed fraud by colluding with the CCIB Gansu.  That 
an agency authorized by the Chinese government 
could issue such an irresponsible certificate is truly as-
tonishing; much more as it is an incompetent agency 
to issue the Inspection Certificate.234 
The arbitrator appointed to the case found that the certificate was not 
issued in accordance with the law, and therefore had no effect. 
The question of whether or not there is corruption in the prac-
tices of CIETAC itself is difficult to answer.  In this article we have 
endeavored to present a balance of the criticisms facing CIETAC and 
its response to these criticisms.  Is CIETAC biased against foreign-
ers? The decisions to which we have had access indicate that this is 
not the case.  Setting aside the issue of whether or not we have the 
complete picture, is it in CIETAC’s best interest as an arbitral body 
dealing with foreign related disputes to be perceived as being biased 
against non-Chinese parties?  The answer is a resounding “no.”  In 
practice this would be quite difficult and costly to achieve, as the par-
ty involved would have to bribe the appointed arbitrator, in addition 
to the Chairperson and the secretary who assists in writing the draft 
decision for approval.  Given the relatively small amounts involved 
in these cases, would it be worth the hassle? 
The reality of the arbitration market in the region is that other 
tribunals, such as the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC), pose 
significant competition for CIETAC.  In fact, many foreign arbitra-
tors have commended BAC’s rules on arbitration as being more 
straightforward than those of CIETAC.235  And yet, CIETAC remains 
the most commonly used tribunal for international arbitration.236  
Based therefore on the available evidence and a logical interpretation 
of the incentives to compete on quality, price and fairness, we con-
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clude that CIETAC’s problems are not so pervasive as to make it un-
competitive. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Over the past thirty years, the world’s most populous country 
has made enormous strides.  Its burgeoning economy has moved 
hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, along the way devel-
oping myriad and sophisticated political, legal and economic institu-
tions.  The cumulative costs of this rapid development are enormous 
in terms of lives, health, environmental degradation and the loss of 
cultural heritage and respect for human dignity.  Even the establish-
ment of legal systems—generally viewed as a positive develop-
ment—brings significant costs.  Moreover, some critics claim that the 
arbitral system upon which China’s economy relies so heavily has 
been developed to the detriment of the formal legal system.  Where 
traders can rely on private justice, pressure to develop and reform is 
taken off the formal legal system, or so goes the argument.  And in-
deed, the argument may be correct, but evidence for it is very diffi-
cult to assemble.  On the other hand, the robust system of commercial 
arbitration can also be seen as promoting peaceful and just develop-
ment in the People’s Republic of China. 
It seems almost too obvious to point out the economic bene-
fits that the Chinese people have enjoyed because of their ability to 
depend on an arbitral system for resolution of commercial disputes. 
Relatively comfortable in the ability to rely on impartial and speedy 
resolution of disputes, foreign traders will be encouraged to increase 
trade with China (and not with countries where disputes are less like-
ly to be resolved fairly).  And because traders have recourse when 
they believe they have suffered from a violation of an obligation, 
they can price the risk of transactions more accurately and in lower 
amounts.  Likewise, both parties are incentivized to look for continu-
ing and improving relationships with one another.  They are encour-
aged to increase the value of the goods traded by providing timely, 
effective and meaningful feedback about quality.  Sellers will reap 
advantages by improving their products.  In short, arbitral systems 
encourage the growth of trade by facilitating the increase of quality 
and lowering transaction costs. 
In addition to these direct economic consequences, the fact 
that China has a robust arbitral system may be encouraging the over-
all development of the rule of law.  As noted above, there may be 
some extent to which traders’ reliance upon arbitration has displaced 
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the impulse to develop the rule of law more generally.  Nevertheless, 
the fact that arbitration occurs regularly in China and that courts are 
required to give decisions effect means that there are at least some 
additional opportunities to provide norm-setting lessons.  Business-
people, lawyers and judges are exposed to a practice of law that is 
faithful to international standards for objectivity, integrity and pro-
fessionalism.  This exposure is, in turn, training Chinese lawyers to 
litigate and settle disputes—skills which readily transfer to their other 
work.  Likewise, judges have their horizons expanded and their ex-
pectations raised.  And we conclude that the people of China’s expec-
tations regarding the due process rights they should demand have 
been raised as well. 
Finally, at the risk of appearing too grandiose in our claims 
for the benefits of this system, we would add that it has global bene-
fits.  First, it serves as a model for improving other developing and 
post-command economies, such as Vietnam.237  Second, by cabining 
commercial conflicts through peaceful resolution, it ensures that 
mere trader disputes do not escalate into wider and more dangerous 
disputes—or increase distrust between the people of China and other 
nations.  Third, by fostering the growth and efficiencies mentioned in 
the first paragraph of this section, the arbitral system is helping to 
create value and ever-greater levels of globalization.  Development 
comes at great cost, but it brings with it unprecedented levels of 
widespread prosperity. 
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